Federal Injunctions Against State Prosecutions Reconsidered by Hernandez, Irma V.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
5-1-1971
Federal Injunctions Against State Prosecutions
Reconsidered
Irma V. Hernandez
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Irma V. Hernandez, Federal Injunctions Against State Prosecutions Reconsidered, 25 U. Miami L. Rev. 506 (1971)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol25/iss3/9
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the soundness of this distinction is questionable. Mere membership,
whether knowing or unknowing, is constitutionally protected under Robel
and Brandenburg. Consequently, as Baird holds, the state has no legiti-
mate interest in demanding disclosure of membership, unless that inquiry
is confined to membership on the part of one sharing the specific intent
to further the organization's unlawful aims. Therefore, the Court's vali-
dation of New York's Question 26 (a) is inconsistent with the reasoning of
Baird and Stolar. Konigsberg is undermined by these companion cases,
but upheld by the instant case. Its continued vitality is, therefore,
uncertain.
The significance of the decision noted herein extends beyond the
narrow confines of the bar admission question. It stands as a further
indication of the Burger Court's retreat from Dombrowski, begun in
Younger v. Harris.40 Appellants' heavy reliance on a "chilling effect"
failed to win them the relief granted, on closely-related grounds, to re-
jected applicants Stolar and Baird.
The instant decision also reveals that a majority of the present Court
holds a "traditional" view of the lawyer's role in society, one more akin
to "officer of the court" than to "vigorous advocate of social change."
These attitudes may be expected to collide with increasing frequency in
the future.
JAMES T. HENDRICK
FEDERAL INJUNCTIONS AGAINST STATE
PROSECUTIONS RECONSIDERED
Harris was indicted and charged with a violation of the California
Criminal Syndicalism Act.' Thereafter, Harris filed suit in a federal dis-
trict court to enjoin Younger, the District Attorney for Los Angeles
County, from prosecuting him.2 Jim Dan and Diane Hirsch, members of
the Progressive Labor Party, and Farrell Broslawsky, a history professor,
intervened as plaintiffs in the district court suit.3 All alleged that immedi-
40. 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971). Noted in 25 U. MIAmi L. REv. 506 (1971).
1. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400-11401 (West 1961).
2. Harris alleged "the prosecution and even the presence of the Act inhibited him in the
exercise of his rights of free speech and press, rights guaranteed to him by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments." Younger v. Harris, 91 S. Ct. 746, 748 (1971).
3. Dan and Hirsch alleged that
the prosecution of Harris would inhibit them as members of the Progressive Labor
Party from peacefully advocating the program of their party which was to replace
capitalism with socialism and to abolish the profit system of production in this
country. Id.
Broslawsky alleged "the prosecution of Harris made him uncertain as to whether he could
teach about the doctrines of Karl Marx or read from the Communist Manifesto as part of his
classwork." Id.
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ate and irreparable injury would result unless the district court restrained
the pending state prosecution of Harris.' A three-judge federal district
court' held that the California Criminal Syndicalism Act was void for
vagueness and overbreadth in violation of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments, and enjoined the further prosecution of the pending action against
Harris.' Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court,7 held: Re-
versed: As to Dan, Hirsch, and Broslawsky, the case was dismissed be-
cause "persons having no fears of state prosecution except those that are
imaginary or speculative are not to be accepted as appropriate plain-
tiffs. . ... ,I In other words, these plaintiffs did not have a justiciable
controversy. As to Harris, the Court reversed and remanded, and held
that the possible unconstitutionality of a statute on its face does not in
itself justify an injunction against good faith attempts to enforce it where
there is no showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual cir-
cumstances that would call for equitable relief. Younger v. Harris, 91 S.
Ct. 746 (1971).
The federal courts have generally avoided interference with threat-
ened or pending criminal prosecutions in a state court. This doctrine of
non-interference has been codified in the Anti-Injunction Act,9 which de-
veloped from the Act of March 2, 1793.10 Paralleling the intention ex-
pressed by Congress in the Anti-Injunction Act and its predecessor, the
federal courts have developed the doctrines of comity and abstention as a
further manifestation of the policy of non-interference in state court
matters. A short review of both doctrines and their exceptions, together
with the effect which Dombrowski v. Pfister" had upon these doctrines,
is imperative in order to understand the significance of Younger v.
Harris.'2
Since their creation, federal courts have been reluctant to exercise
their equity powers to restrain prosecutions which are pending or threat-
ened in state courts. 8 This policy of non-interference is based on the
concept that "federal courts, in exercising their jurisdiction, should give
consideration to the sovereign status of the individual state." This policy
is commonly referred to as "the doctrine of comity." 4
4. Id.
S. Convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1964).
6. 281 F. Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
7. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964).
8. 91 S. Ct. 746, 749 (1971).
9. "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of
its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964).
10. Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 12, § 720, 1 Stat. 136.
11. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
12. 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899).
14. Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Significance
of Dombrowski, 48 TEXAs L. REv. 535, 541 (1979) f4.9einafter cited as Maraist].
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An exception to this doctrine was created in Ex Parte Young,'" where
the Court granted injunctive relief against a state officer to prevent
threatened enforcement of an unconstitutional criminal statute, which
provided for severe sanctions and exorbitant fines for disobedience of an
order fixing the rates for railroads in Minnesota. While the Court recog-
nized the general rule that federal courts cannot interfere in a case where
the proceedings are already pending in a state court, 16 an injunction was
granted in view of the fact that the statute involved was unconstitutional
on its face, and that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable loss if the
threatened proceedings were not enjoined.' 7
In 1941, the Court, in Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 18 noted that if the
federal district court found "irreparable injury" which was both great and
immediate, together with the threat of a "multiplicity of prosecutions,"
then a federal court injunction of state proceedings would be proper."
Watson v. Buck2° established the test which is to be applied by the federal
district courts in determining whether to grant an injunction against
threatened prosecution under an unconstitutional state statute.
The imminence and immediacy of proposed enforcement, the
nature of the threats actually made, and the exceptional and
irreparable injury which complainants would sustain if those
threats were carried out, are among the vital allegations which
must be shown to exist before restraint of criminal proceedings
is justified.21
The policy of non-interference with state court proceedings was
restated in Douglas v. City of Jeannette.2 The Court noted that no person
was immune from good faith criminal prosecution, and the fact that the
statute or ordinance was allegedly unconstitutional was not enough to
justify federal injunctive relief.- It was stated in Douglas that the injury
caused by a single criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith
was not the sort of irreparable injury which warrants a federal court's
enjoining a threatened state court criminal prosecution. 24
Another aspect of the doctrine of non-intervention was enunciated
by Justice Frankfurter, in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co. 25
[T]he federal courts, "exercising a wise discretion," restrain
their authority because of "scrupulous regard for the rightful
15. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
16. Id. at 155-56.
17. Id.
18. 312 U.S. 45 (1941).
19. Id. at 50.
20. 313 U.S. 387 (1941).
21. Id. at 400.
22. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
23. Id. at 163.
24. Id. at 163-64.
25. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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independence of the state governments" and for the smooth
working of the federal judiciary."
This doctrine, known as the "abstention doctrine," permits a federal court
whose jurisdiction has been properly invoked to postpone any decision,
pending trial of the case in a state court thus giving the state court the
opportunity to dispose of the case on the basis of state law."
Abstention has often sent the litigants on a long and arduous road
through the state courts s.2 The Supreme Court has tacitly admitted that
the doctrine might prove to be a hardship, and that, in some instances,
it serves to deny litigants a federal forum for the decision of their federal
claims.29 In addition, the doctrine has been used to dam the flow of "civil
rights" cases which flooded the federal courts after World War II.1° It
was clear to the federal judiciary that strict application of abstention to
civil rights actions was an obstacle to effective protection of constitutional
guarantees. 81
Thus, the need arose to create an exception to the abstention doctrine
where certain federal "civil rights" were involved.82 In Monroe v. Pape,"8
the Court disregarded abstention, stating that "the federal remedy is
supplementary to the state remedy and the latter need not be first sought
and refused before the federal one is invoked."34 In 1963, the Court
reaffirmed this exception in the case of McNeese v. Board of Education,36
wherein the Court explained that the Congressional purpose in the en-
acting of section 198386 would be defeated if the assertion of the federal
claim had to await an attempt to vindicate the same right in state courts.3 7
Subsequent to Monroe and McNeese, the Court, in Baggett v. Bullet,88
suggested that the abstention doctrine is not applicable in cases involving
the infringement of first amendment rights:
[A]bstention operates to require piecemeal adjudication in many
courts . . . a result quite costly where the vagueness of a state
statute may inhibit the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.
26. Id. at 501.
27. See generally Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an
Activist Era, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 604 (1967).
28. See Kurland, Toward a Co-Operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Ab-
stention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 489 (1959).
29. See County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Company, 360 U.S. 185, 196-97 (1959).
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Exam., 375 U.S. 411, 425-27 (1964), concurring
opinion of Justice Douglas citing Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TExAs
L. REV. 815 (1959).
30. Maraist, supra note 14, at 539.
31. Id.
32. Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an Activist
Era, 80 HARv. L. REv. 604, 607 (1967).
33. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
34. Id. at 183.
35. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
37. 373 U.S. 668, 675 (1963).
38. 377 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1964).
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Thus, by 1965, the abstention doctrine was no longer the strict non-
interference policy which it had been originally. With the addition of the
"civil rights" and the first amendment exceptions, abstention lost much
of its vitality.3 9
In 1965 the Court decided Dombrowski v. Pfister.4 In Dombrowski,
an action was brought under the Civil Rights Act 4' seeking a declaratory
judgment and an injunction restraining defendants from prosecuting or
threatening to prosecute plaintiffs for alleged violations of the Louisiana
Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law42 and Communist
Propaganda Control Law. 43 A three-judge district court denied relief.4"
The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the Anti-Injunction Act45 did
not apply because there was no pending prosecution.46 It also noted plain-
tiff's allegation that there were threats of multiple prosecutions with no
real intent to obtain valid convictions. The Court considered these factors
as sufficient irreparable injury to justify injunctive relief.47 In regard to
the abstention doctrine, the Court concluded that where state statutes on
their face violate first amendment rights, or the statutes are being used for
the purpose of discouraging protected first amendment activities, absten-
tion was improper. 8
The Dombrowski decision did not give the lower courts clear guide-
lines as to its scope and future application. The majority opinion held,
in effect, that there is sufficient showing of irreparable injury, justifying
injunctive relief49 when the prosecution or threat of prosecution under an
overbroad statute works a "chilling effect" on freedom of expression. 50
This language has been widely used by the lower courts to justify grant-
ing an injunction against threatened state prosecutions, and in some in-
stances, against pending state prosecutions." Since Dombrowski, literally
hundreds of cases in the lower courts have claimed the benefit of the
doctrine.52
Understandably, there has been confusion and disagreement among
the many lower court interpretations of Dombrowski.5 3 Professor Wright
has expressed the need for further clarification of the doctrine:
It is ... hoped that the decision of these cases [set for rehear-
39. Maraist, supra note 14, at 541.
40. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
41. 42 U.S.C. 11983 (1964).
42. LA. RFv. STAT. ANx. §114:358,14:374 (Cum. Supp. 1962).
43. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:390, 14:390.8 (Cum. Supp. 1962).
44. 227 F. Supp. 556, 564 (E.D. La. 1964).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964).
46. 380 U.S. at 484 n.2.
47. Id. at 489.
48. Id. at 491-92.
49. Id. at 489.
50. Id. at 486-88.
S1. Maraist, supra note 14, at 581 n.215 and cases cited therein.
52. C. WGnET, Fzau~l. CouRTs § 52 (2d ed. 1970).
$3. Id.
[Vol. XXV
CASES NOTED
ing], will clarify the meaning of Dombrowski and will establish
that every person prosecuted under state law for conduct ar-
guably protected by the First Amendment cannot, by murmuring
the words "chilling effect," halt the state prosecution while a fed-
eral court ... passes on the validity of the statute and the bona
fides of the state law enforcement officers.5 4
The questions of whether Dombrowski-type relief could be expanded
to cover pending prosecutions, and whether it could cover any action under
color of law were live controversies when Younger v. Harris5 reached the
Court.
In Younger, the Court first turned its attention to appellees Dan,
Hirsch and Broslawsky. These parties had never been threatened with
state prosecution, and their only allegation was that they "felt inhibited"
by the mere presence of the state statute on the books. The Court stated
that there was no live controversy, that they were not the proper plaintiffs
to bring the suit, and that they had no standing to attack the statute as
it applied to defendant Harris.
It had been suggested that Dombrowski-type cases supported a rule
of standing which stated that:
Any party whose exercise of freedom of expression is being
abridged by the existence of an overbroad statute regulating ex-
pression has standing to seek a declaratory judgment and in-
junctive relief against the statute. 6
It appears from the decision in the instant case that standing has been
restricted to include only those parties who are threatened with prosecu-
tion or are actually prosecuted under an overbroad statute. The Court
specifically stated that the allegation made by appellees Dan, Hirsch and
Broslawsky of "feeling inhibited" by the mere presence of the Act was
insufficient to warrant a federal court injunction restraining a pending
state criminal prosecution.5 7
Appellee Harris, however, was being criminally prosecuted in the
state court. His case, therefore, fulfilled the standing requirement. In dis-
cussing his case, the Court first gave a brief exposition of the historical
background behind the long-standing public policy against federal court
interference with state court proceedings and cited cases supporting the
doctrine of comity and its exceptions. The Court emphasized the need
for exceptional circumstances and a great and immediate danger of
irreparable loss, prior to issuance of a federal court injunction against a
state proceeding. The injury caused by a single good faith state prosecu-
tion was expressly excluded from the concept of "irreparable injury."58
54. Id.
55. 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971).
56. Maraist, supra note 14, at 589 (emphasis added).
57. 91 S. Ct. 746, 749-50 (1971).
58. Id. at 751.
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Dombrowski was distinguished on its facts: [the] circumstances,
as viewed by the Court [in Dombrowski] sufficiently establish
the kind of irreparable injury, above and beyond that associated
with the defense of a single prosecution brought in good faith,
that had always been considered sufficient to justify federal
intervention."9
It appears that the bad faith element present in Dombrowski was not
present in Younger. Also, there was no pending state prosecution in Dom-
browski unlike the situation in Younger.
The district court in Younger had interpreted Dombrowski as sub-
stantially broadening the availability of injunctions against state criminal
prosecution. It viewed Dombrowski as permitting the federal courts to
grant equitable relief against state prosecutions without regard to any
showing of bad faith, whenever a state statute is found "on its face" to
be vague or overbroad, in violation of the first amendment.10 The Supreme
Court disapproved of this interpretation and considered the reasons sup-
porting such a position inadequate.0" The Court reasoned that: (1) the
Dombrowski-type relief was not effective in eliminating the uncertainty as
to the state statutes, and (2) the states would be stripped of all power
to prosecute even constitutionally unprotected conduct until a new statute
could be passed.2 The "chilling effect" which Dombrowski considered so
important to first amendment freedoms was minimized by the Court:
[T]he existence of a "chilling effect," even in the area of First
Amendment rights, has never been considered a sufficient basis,
in and of itself, for prohibiting state action. 3
The Younger Court also found the procedure for testing the constitution-
ality of a statute by resorting to either a declaratory judgment or injunc-
tive relief in a federal court to be "fundamentally at odds with the func-
tion of the federal courts in our constitutional plan. ' 64 The Court stated
that
the possible unconstitutionality of a statute "on its face" does not
in itself justify an injunction against good faith attempts to en-
force it... [where there is no] showing of bad faith, harassment,
or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable
relief.65
Thus, it appears that in order for a federal court to exercise equitable
powers to restrain a pending state criminal prosecution, there must be
a showing of irreparable injury both great and immediate and (1) an un-
59. Id. at 752.
60. Id. at 753.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 753-54.
63. ld. at 753.
64. Id. at 754.
65. Id. at 755.
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constitutional statute; (2) a bad faith attempt to enforce it; or (3)
another unusual circumstance which would suggest that a single defense
of the action in the state court will not adequately protect the defendant's
federal constitutional rights.
Younger has categorized Dombrowski as another exception to the
comity doctrine. It has also placed in doubt the existence of a first amend-
ment exception to the abstention doctrine. No longer can plaintiffs murmur
"chilling effect" and obtain federal courts' equitable relief against pending
good faith attempts to enforce a state statute which "tends to have the
incidental effect of inhibiting first amendment rights."66
The absence of discussion concerning the abstention doctrine in
Younger is significant. The sharp restriction imposed upon Dombrowski-
type relief necessarily affects abstention because a portion of the
Dombrowski holding referred to the impropriety of abstention in first
amendment cases.67 This absence of discussion seems to indicate that the
federal courts should not apply the abstention doctrine in first amendment
cases unless the prerequisites for equitable relief against a pending state
prosecution are satisfied.
The Younger opinion makes no mention of the factors which are
necessary before a federal court may exercise equitable powers to restrain
future state prosecutions. However, insight on this subject may be gleaned
from the cases decided by the Supreme Court on the same day as
Younger.
Boyle v. Landry68 was a class action by Chicago citizens for a declara-
tory judgment and injunctive relief against the enforcement of several
Illinois statutes and Chicago ordinances. The Supreme Court held that
no injunction should have been issued in the absence of any threat of
state prosecution. The Court stated that "the normal course of state crim-
inal prosecutions cannot be disrupted or blocked on the basis of charges
which in the last analysis amount to nothing more than speculation about
the future." 69 Apparently, threats of prosecution under an unconstitutional
statute are one of the essential factors which form the concept of "irrepa-
rable injury." A showing of irreparable injury which is both great and
immediate is necessary before a federal court can exercise its equitable
powers against future state prosecutions.
In Samuels v. Mackrell7° the plaintiffs had been indicted in New
York state courts on charges of criminal anarchy. The plaintiffs prayed
for a federal court injunction against the state court proceedings, or in
the alternative, for a declaratory judgment. After denying injunctive relief
on the basis of Younger v. Harris, the Court held that where the state
criminal prosecution had begun prior to the federal suit, the same equita-
66. Id. at 754.
67. 380 U.S. 479, 491-92 (1965).
68. 91 S. Ct. 758 (1971).
69. Id. at 760.
70. 91 S. Ct. 764 (1971).
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ble principles that apply to injunctions must be taken into consideration
by federal district courts in determining whether to issue a declaratory
judgment. Where an injunction would be impermissible under these prin-
ciples, declaratory relief should ordinarily be denied as well.7 '
Prior to this opinion, declaratory judgments were thought to be ap-
propriate and were more liberally granted than injunctive relief in similar
circumstances. 7s As with Younger, the Court failed to set guidelines for
federal equitable relief where there is no pending state prosecution.
Dyson v. Stein73 was decided per curiam. The Court again stated that
there must be a finding of irreparable injury, carefully determined from
the facts of the case, before a federal court may grant injunctive or de-
claratory relief against a pending state prosecution.
Byrnes v. Karalexis,74 also decided per curiam, was a similar suit.
In this case the Court stated that "the threat to appellees' federally pro-
tected rights was not shown to be one that cannot be eliminated by his
defense against a single criminal prosecution.
'7
,
In conclusion, it is evident that Younger v. Harris and its companion
cases have established new standards for the propriety of federal inter-
vention in pending state criminal proceedings. These cases stand for the
proposition that federal injunctions and declaratory relief against a pend-
ing state prosecution are not proper unless it is shown that irreparable
injury, both great and immediate, will occur. Although the Court did not
undertake to define all of the circumstances which result in the requisite
irreparable injury, 70 it is clear that the following conditions satisfy the
test for the issuance of an injunction against the state court criminal
proceedings: a pending prosecution brought under an unconstitutional
statute in such a manner that the threat to appellee's federally protected
rights is one that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single
criminal prosecution, or the criminal prosecution-or threats thereof-
are brought in bad faith, for the purpose of harassment, with no real hope
of securing a valid state conviction.
IRMA V. HERNANDEZ
71. Id. at 768.
72. Id. at 769.
73. 91 S. Ct. 769 (1971).
74. 91 S. Ct. 777 (1971).
75. Id. at 780.
76. Other unusual situations calling for federal intervention might also arise, but
there is no point in our attempting now to specify what they might be.
91 S. Ct. at 755.
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